
Iran and Israel exchanged fire overnight in the most serious escalation since a U.S.-Iranian truce was reached in April. Iran launched a wave of missiles at northern Israel in retaliation for Israeli attacks near Beirut on Sunday. Israel responded with attacks on Iran, with explosions reported in Tehran, Tabriz and Isfahan. This comes as peace talks appear stalled between the United States and Iran, largely over Iran’s insistence that any agreement must include Lebanon and halt Israel’s attacks on that country. President Donald Trump has also repeatedly expressed frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and reports from NBC News and The New York Times indicate the Pentagon is growing increasingly concerned over Israel spying on U.S. officials.
“I was not surprised by the Iranian attack on Israel,” says analyst Trita Parsi, who notes that Iran’s leaders want to “extend their deterrence” to Lebanon. “What is perhaps a bit surprising is … that the Israelis defied Trump’s expressed wishes.”
Transcript
AMY GOODMAN: In the most serious escalation since a U.S.-Iranian so-called truce was reached in April, Iran and Israel exchanged fire overnight. Iran launched a wave of missiles at northern Israel, saying it was in response to Israeli attacks near Beirut on Sunday. Israel responded with attacks on several areas of Iran, including the capital Tehran. Earlier today, Iran announced it’s halting strikes on Israel, but warned it will carry out a more severe response if Israel continues to attack Lebanon. Israel attacked Iran despite President Trump telling Axios on Sunday that he planned to call Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to urge him not to respond to the first wave of Iranian missiles.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei spoke in Tehran earlier today.
ESMAIL BAGHAEI: [translated] America has direct responsibility in any action that the Zionist regime carries out in relation to violation of regional peace and security against Iran.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re joined now by Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, author of several books, including Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy. His latest piece for Responsible Statecraft is “Iran Strikes Israel, proving it will use hard power on behalf of Lebanon.”
Why don’t you elaborate on that? Were you surprised by this major violation of the so-called ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran? And what this says about how much power President Trump has over Netanyahu? He said he warned him not to do this, not to respond to Iran attacking Israel for Israel attacking Lebanon.
TRITA PARSI: Thank you, Amy. Good to be with you.
I was not surprised by the Iranian attack on Israel. In fact, a couple of days ago, just before Trump had his first colorful conversation with Netanyahu, the Iranians had already signaled that they were about to strike Israel. They were probably 45 to 60 minutes away of doing so. That’s when Trump intervened, and the situation was defused. So, the fact that the Iranians were going to enforce their red line in Lebanon, I don’t think was a surprise, and I think the U.S. government took it seriously, as well. What is perhaps a bit surprising is the immediate reaction that Trump had, and, of course, then, that the Israelis defied Trump’s expressed wishes. And where that goes from now, we will have to see.
But it’s important to understand that what the Iranians were trying to do, and what really worries the Israelis, is that they were trying to extend their deterrence. They had already established their own deterrence, in the sense that any attack on Iran clearly would be retaliated against, but now they were trying to say that even if the Israelis were to attack Lebanon, southern Lebanon, they would also face Iranian retaliation, which would be the first time in a very long time that a major power would put real hard power behind a warning or a deterrent against an attack by Israel on a third country. And this is part of what the Israelis are worried about, because if it suddenly means that they can no longer have that complete maneuverability in Lebanon and Gaza and elsewhere that they enjoy, that they are enjoying because the West is, more and less, enabling that to happen, they’re politically defending it, etc., and for the last couple of decades it has not been challenged by any regional state in a sincere or serious way — this appears to have been an attempt by the Iranians to challenge that, to establish this extended deterrence, and this is part of the reason why the Israelis have acted so aggressively against this attempt, as they call it, to establish a new equation in the region.
AMY GOODMAN: I mean, it’s interesting —
TRITA PARSI: — because it would dramatically minimize Israel’s maneuverability if it were to stand.
AMY GOODMAN: So, Trump has spoken to Netanyahu. It’s interesting that it’s Iran first that says they’re not going to attack Israel if Israel doesn’t attack again Iran or, I presume, Lebanon. And is this Iran saying, “You can’t have a side agreement that’s being negotiated in Washington that excludes Hezbollah between Israel and Lebanon. It is part of the ceasefire, so-called ceasefire, with Iran”?
TRITA PARSI: Iranians have, from the outset, said that if there is to be a ceasefire and an end to the war between the U.S. and Iran, then it has to be regionwide, meaning that it has to encompass Israel, as well. If it doesn’t, if Israel is unrestrained, it will have an ability to restart the war and the ability to drag the U.S. back into the war. Since the objective is to end the war and to end it in a durable manner, making sure that the Israelis cannot have the freedom of starting the war again or bombing Lebanon or other places has to be included. That is the Iranian perspective.
The question is: If now when they are signaling that they’re willing to back off, are they doing so in order to put pressure on the U.S. to now deal with Israel, or are they doing so because they’re regretting their attack and realizing that the Israelis would strike at them much harder? It remains to be seen exactly what the calculation is. But I don’t think that the Iranian side is going to back off from its demand that any end to the war has to be regionwide and has to include Lebanon and Israel, as well.
AMY GOODMAN: Talking about a ceasefire in Gaza and a ceasefire in Lebanon, can we still use that term, or should we be saying “increase fire”? I mean, we’re talking about thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese dying since this so-called truce, in both areas.
TRITA PARSI: These so-called ceasefires that have been established in Gaza or in Lebanon are exactly what the region doesn’t want, exactly what the Iranians at this point seem to be rallying against, because they’re completely one-sided. They’re Swiss cheeses of a ceasefire and fundamentally unacceptable. And what their worry is is that the U.S. will put some pressure on the Israelis to cease fire, and the ceasefire will only last a couple of days or so, and then slowly but surely the Israelis would once again restart attacks against whether it is Lebanon or whether it is Gaza. And they don’t want to see a scenario of that kind be repeated. And as a result, they’re now using some of their hard power to essentially signal that any ceasefire, any end of the deal, has to be complete; otherwise, it will be a complete war — instead of this kind of shameful situation you have right now, in which we call it a ceasefire, but more than 3,500 Lebanese have been killed in that so-called ceasefire.
AMY GOODMAN: So, what do you expect to happen at this point? I mean, while President Trump has said he could be prime minister of Israel, in fact, how much sway does President Trump have over Netanyahu? I mean, can Netanyahu continue attacking Iran if Trump doesn’t want him to, given the amount of weapons the U.S. gives and can withhold from Israel?
TRITA PARSI: Without a doubt, just a phone call or some angry quotes to the media is not going to be enough to get Netanyahu and Israel to back down. If Trump is serious about restraining the Israelis, it has to be combined with a restriction of arms sales, sharing of intelligence, and other measures that enable the Israelis to conduct these attacks in the first place.
I suspect that the Trump administration’s calculation, however, is they do not want to have that massive fight with Israel about a real restraint on them, unless they have a deal with Iran. It is not worth it for them to take a gamble and have that big fight with Israel in the hope of getting a deal with Iran, because then they may end up spending all of that political capital fighting the Israelis and still not get a deal with Iran. So, I think the administration’s position is that they will only do so if there is a deal with Iran, and the Iranian position is that there won’t be a deal with Iran unless you prove your ability to restrain the Israelis.
AMY GOODMAN: Trita Parsi, I want to thank you for being with us, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. We’ll link to your latest piece, “Iran strikes Israel, proving it will use hard power on behalf of Lebanon.”
Coming up, we go to Maine to look at the campaign and controversies around Graham Platner, the oysterman, Marine vet, progressive Democrat who’s seeking to unseat the Republican Maine Senator Susan Collins. Stay with us.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: “Landed” by Sophia Shorai.












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